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THE ACTION PER QUOD SERVITIUM AMISIT 
I. INTRODUCTION. 
Following the decision of the Attorney-General v Wilson 
1 
and Horton Ltd, section 5 of the Accidents Compensation 
Amendment Act 1973, which came into force along with the 
principal act in April 1974, abolished in New Zealand the 
common law action which was available to an employer for the 
loss of services of his employee. The cause of action per 
quod servitium amisit lies at the suit of an employer against 
any third person who has wrongfully injured the employer's 
"servant". Despite recommendations for its abolition in 
England the action still remains extant in that country (as 
well as in Commonwealth countries such as Australia and Canada) 
One of the authorities which the New Zealand Court of 
2 Appeal in Attorney-General v Wilson and Horton Ltd, considered 
when deciding to what extent (if at all) the old cause of 
action survived in New Zealand was a decision of the English 
Court of Appeal, 3 Inland Revenue Commissiones v Hambrook, in 
which the judgment of Denning L.J. (as he was then) featur e d. 
That case held that the action per quod was r es tricted to 
relationships of master and servant where the services which 
the master has lost are in respect of "domestics" or "menials", 
thereby severely limiting the scope of the action. Hence, 
the action was held not to be available to the Crown for the 
loss of services of a tax officer. The grounds upon which 
4 Hambrook's case was decided, as they are contained in the 
judgment of Lord Denning have been heavily criticised in a 
~ictori3 University of 
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decision of the High Court of Australia,
5 
(which was approved 
by the New Zealand court in Attorney-General v Wilson and 
Horton) and by various 6 commentators. Since Hambrook's case, 
however, the English courts have not been called on to consider 
a case where the action per quad servitium amisit has been 
invoked; so that the fate of the action remains undecided in 
England. 
Since the early part of this centurythe courts have been 
describing the action per quad as "anomalous"; and in 1963 
7 
and again in 1968
8 
abolition of the action has been recommended 
in England. But the legislature in England has not been as 
hasty as the New Zealand Parliament, and as yet no legislative 
action has been taken. 
This article will, firstly, in the light of a brief 
description of the historical basis of the action per quad 
servitium amisit, analyse the scope of the action as defined 
in 9 Hambrook's case with particular reference to the judgment 
of Lord Denning. It will then consider waysin which the action 
has been regarded as "anomalous", including a discussion on 
the question of damages. Finally, the article will look at 
the possibility of law reform in England, and will assess the 
future of the action. 
II THE HISTORICAL BASIS AND SCOPE OF THE ACTION. 
A. Historical Basis. 
It is not intended to give here an extensive historical 
account of the action per quad servitium amisit, but merely 
to provide, briefly, the historical basis of the action as a 
backbround for a critical analysis of Hambrook's case which 
purports to define the scope of the action in England as it 
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stands today. 
In the course of a thorough examination of the history 
of the action per quad Dixon J saidlO "From early times 
trespass could be brought by a master for a battery of his 
servant whereby the master lost his services .... In trespass 
by a master for the battery of his servant it was necessary 
to allege that thereby the plaintiff lost the services of his 
servant. In such a case 'the master might recover for the 
services and the servant for the battery'." 
. . 11 
In quoting Dicey 
the same judge noted
12 
that for a master to support an action 
per quad it did not matter how the injur y was caused to the 
servant, but, that loss of service was essential (though the 
service need only be de facto, i.e. no contract of employment 
was required). An oft-quoted passage found in the cases on 
the 13 action per quad is taken from Holdsworth . In referring 
to the remedies of a master under the action in trespass of 
per quad servitium amisit he said,
14 
"They rested at bottom 
on the idea that the master had a quasi-proprietary interest 
in his servant's services, " And that idea, the learned 
author went on to say, was connected with ideas of status. 
For the purposes of the following analysis of Hambrook's 
case and for the discussion contained in the subsequent parts 
of this article the important point to be extracted from the 
passages referred to above is that, according to the pre-
dominance of authority, the action per quad servitium amisit, 
originally, was based on the idea that the master was considered 
to have a proprietary or 'quasi-proprietary' interest in the 
services of his employee. It followed then, that what the 
master had to establish under the action was loss of services 
and what he recovered was " his damages for the loss of 
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his [the servant's] services, II 15 
B. Hambrook's Case 
1. The Facts 
Shortly, the facts of Inland Revenue Commissioners v 
16 Hambrook are as follows: the Inland Revenue Commissioners 
brought an action on behalf of the Crown, claiming damages 
for the loss of services of a tax officer, B, against the 
defendant for negligently injuring their (alleged) 'servant', 
B. At first instance Lord Goddard C.J. . 17 gave Judgment for 
the defendant on the ground that the relationship between the 
plaintiffs and the injured civil servant, B, was wholly 
different in bind from the ordinary relationship of master 
and servant, upon which the action per quod was based, i.e. 
the relationship was of a pub lic nature. The case went on 
appeal to the Court of Appeal where their Lordships Denning, 
Birkett and Parker L.J.J. upheld the decision of the Chief 
Justice, but, decided the appeal on the "broader ground" that 
the action per quod was limited to employers whose servants 
came within household relationships, who could be described 
as 'menials ' or 'domestics'. The leading judgment was 
delivered by Denning L.J. with whom Birkett and Parker L.J.J. 
concurred. It is, therefore, Lord Denning's judgment which 
will be examined mainly. 
2. Servants are 'chattels ' 
Lord Denning commences his judgment by analysing the 
ancient common law action . He states that the action per quod 
originated at a time when service was based on status. Because 
this is no longer the case today, when service is based on 
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contract, he concludes that the action per quod is, therefore, 
an anomaly seeing as it no longer fits into the principles 
of law as now understood. Although this conclusion itself has 
been challenged by Windeyer J. in Commissioners for Railways 
(N. S. W.) 
18 
v Scott , at this point it is the next statement of 
His Lordship which the writer wishes to examine. 
Lord Denning says of the action per quod that "It treats 
a servant as a chattel belonging to his 
19 
master". All 
throughout his examination of the history of the action His 
Lordship treats it as being based on the notion that the 
servant was the property of the master. From the beginning 
it is submitted, Lord Denning has erred in proceeding upon the 
assumption that the action per quod was founded upon the notion 
that the master had a proprietary interest in the person of 
his servant. It can hardly be doubted that, as has been 
observed in the above examination of the historical basis of 
the .action, the action per quod was based upon the idea that 
a master had a quasi-proprietary interest in the services of 
his servant. In considering the judgement of Lord Denning 
in Hambrook's case Kitto Jin Scott 's case thought that 
II too much has been extracted from the notion that the 
basis of the action per quod is the ancient idea of the master 
having a property in his 
20 
servant." He then went on to say, 
"But although it is true that the basic idea of the action is 
sometimes in the books described as the notion of a master's 
having a proprietary interest in his servant, the fuller and 
(I think) the more accurate way of stating it is more often 
found, namely that the master's quasi-proprietary right which 
founds the action is in the services which he would have 
, I • II 21 received but for the defendants wrongdoing. And in the 
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22 New Zealand decision, Attorney-General v Wilson and Horton 
Richmond J. concurring with Windeyer Jin Scott's case said: 
"[T]he various medieaval remedies which the master had in 
respect of his servants, including of course the action per 
quod, rested at bottom on the idea that the master had a 
quasi-proprietary interest in the servant's services and not 
upon any notion that he had some form of proprietary interest 
in the servant himself 1124 [Emphasis added] 
On the footing that the action per quod treats a servant 
as a 'chattel' Lord Denning attempted to illustrate an 
anomaly arising from the action in respect of contributory 
1
. 2 5 neg igence. However, it is in examining and setting the 
limits to the scope of the action by an historical survey that 
Lord Denning and his judicial brethren erred most seriously. 
3. The action in the eighteenth century 
After a brief historical examination of the law from the 
Middle Ages to the eighteenth century, Lord Denning boldly 
26 announces: "The eighteenth century sees an important 
development. We find that the action per quod has become 
confined to menial servantsand apprentices, those who lived 
in the household for the very good reason that they alone 
could then be considered as the property of the master." At 
page 664 of the report, after outlining the reasons and 
authorities for the above limitation of the action he states: 
"We may take it, therefore, that at the close of the 
eighteenth century the action was confined to members of the 
household who rendered services to the head of it and who had 
to be kept by him in sickness and in health - sons, daughters, 
apprentices, and so forth - for in them alone was there a 
- 7 -
resemblance of property." 
It is quite obvious from the above passage that Denning 
C.J. gives as the rationale for the alleged restriction of 
the scope of the per quod action in the eighteenth century 
the notion that the master possessed property in his servants. 
As we have already discovered, by ascribing to the foundation 
of the action per quod such a proprietary notion his Lordship 
is clearly in error. 27 Windeyer J remarks that this hypothesis 
put forward in Hambrook proceeds upon two assumptions: (1) that 
the action per quod servitium amisit originated in the violation 
of a proprietary right a master had in his servants; ( 2) that 
in the eighteenth century the master's servants and apprentices 
were the property of the master - both of which are mistaken. 
If one accepts both of these assumptions it does, indeed, seem 
a logical step to restrict the action to members of the master's 
household. But if, as other authorities have found, the action 
is based on the interest a master had in the services of his 
servants, and if, during the eighteenth century, members of 
the master's household were not regarded as his property (the 
High Court of Australia did not think so,
28 
nor can any other 
authority be found to support this conclusion), then, it does 
not follow logically at all, to say that the action should be 
limited to 'domestics' only. And from this conclusion one 
begins to doubt whether, in fact, as Lord Denning attempts to 
demonstrate, the history of the action supports the finding 
that its scope was limited in respect of 'menials'. 
Denning L.J. relies on three sources of authority for 
limiting the action per quod in respect of menial or domestic 
servants (and apprentices). He relies on, firstly certain 
passages in the first volume of Sir William Blackstone's 
Ca. 
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"Commentaries "; secondly, certain dicta of Eyre C.J. in 
1 
,29 
Tay or v Neri thirdly the decision of the Privy Council 
30 
in Attorney-General for New South Wales v Perpetual Trustee Co. 
The four judges who comprised the majority in Scott's case 
criticised Lord Denning ' s reasoning on all three grounds. 
Windeyer J concisely expressed their view of the reasoning 
adopted in Hambrook ' s case when he said,
31 
"I do not find the 
view of the Court of Appeal that the action lies only in the 
case of menial servants convincing. " 
4. Blackstone's "Commentaries" -· the first ground 
One of Lord Denning's grounds for h olding that in the 
eighteenth century the action per quad had come to be limited 
to menial or domestic servants was said to be found in Sir 
William Blackstone's "Commentaries", vol. 1 , Book 1. Blackstone 
32 
begins the relevant chapter by describing the relation of 
master and servant as one of the "three great relations in 
private life". He divides servants into four categories, 
(1) menial servants (or domestics); (2) apprentices, 
(3) labourers, (4) sup erior servants. "The author first deals 
with the manner in which the relation of service affects the 
33 
master and servant." Then, he deals with the manner in which 
'strangers' are affected by the relationship and he lists 
four matters: the right of a master to maintain his son's 
litigation; the action per quad servitium amisit; the right of 
the master to justify an assault in defence of his servant 
or vice versa; a master's action for damages in the event of his 
servant leaving him to go to another. 
34 
Blackstone after 
discussing the last of the four matters listed says: "The 
reason and foundation upon which all this doctrine is built, 
a. 
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seem to be the property that every man has in the service 
of his domestics; acquired by the contract of hiring and 
purchased by giving wages." 
Lord Denning states: "By domestics Sir William Blackstone 
clearly meant the menial servants described by him in his 
first category. He seems to have considered a master to have 
a property in his menial servants, but not in others. 1135 
Kitto J. in Scott's case makes a rather acid comment on this 
interpretation: "One who reads the whole of p. 429 of 
Blackstone, and reads it in its context, may be pardoned for 
thinking that the use of the word 'domestic' in the one 
sentence in which Denning L.J. quoted has been allowed to 
outweigh more important indications of the learned author's 
meaning." The Australia judge considered that when Blackstone 
was dealing with the manner in which strangers were affected 
by the master/servant relationship because, in respect of 
liability as between servant and master Blackstone differen-
tiates each category of servants, yet speaks "quite generally, 
not suggesting at any point that it makes a difference in regard 
to a stranger whether a servant belongs to one class or another", 
for this reason, Blackstone must have been referring to all 
four categories of servants which he described.
36 
To back up 
this view 
37 
Kitto J quotes a sentence from Blackstone (in 
connexion with matter (2) listed by Blackstone, ante) which 
precedes the sentence, the interpretation of which Kitto J and 
others in the High Court of Australia disputed: "[A) master 
also may bring an action against any man for beating or maiming 
his servants, but in each such case he must assign, as a 
special reason for so doing, his own damage by the lossof his 
service; and this loss must be proved upon the trial." 
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38 Kitto J says that "There is much difficulty in supposing 
that the generality of this proposition was intended to be 
understood as cut down by the inclusion of the word "domestic" 
in the final sentence of this paragraph. "He felt that too 
much had been made of the idea that a master had a proprietary 
right in his servant from which the limitation imposed by the 
Court of Appeal in Hambrook's case had been inferred. Then 
39 follow the words already quoted above where the same judge 
explains the true basis of the action. 
· 40 1 f h · · h h · d Menzies J. was a so o t e opinion tat t e passage cite 
from Blackstone by Denning L.J. to support his finding related 
"not merely to servants of the first sort, i.e. menials or 
domestics, ... " but was of "general application". In addition, 
he cites a difficulty which stands in the way of Lord Denning's 
interpreation confining the action to menials; the difficulty 
being that " ... the action clearly enough lay in respect of the 
second class, i.e. apprentices". But, further, Menzies J. 
observes that the action per quod was considered as but one of 
41 four matters, and there would be no good reason for treating 
it separately from the other three, confining it to one sort 
of servant. II 
Windeyer merely with Menzies by saying 
42 
that J concurs J 
the disputed passage, when read in its context, does not support 
the contention of Lord Denning. But so as to leave no doubt 
as to the correctness of this view he adds: "If it [the passage] 
does [support Lord Denning's finding], it is worth noting 
that Professor Plucknett has said of Blackstone that 'his 
history was not very profound, for like so many practising 
lawyers of that time (and later) he expected little more in 
a 
fer quod 
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history than a plausibility at first sight'". 
43 
5. Taylor v Neri - The second ground 
Lord Denning, after he had cited Blackstone in support 
of his finding that the action per quod was, in the eighteenth 
century, restricted to menial or domestic servants, then refers 
t th f 1 .44 o e case o Tay or v Neri as an authoritative precedent 
in the second ground for this decision. In that case 
the hirer of an opera singer, Breda, was suing to recover 
damages for the loss of his services as the result of an 
assault on Breda by the defendant. Eyre L.J. (described by 
Lord Denning as "a most respected and experienced judge") 
was reported by Espinasse to have held that it was doubtful 
whether the action per quod had ever gone further than the 
case of a menial servant. His Lordship further remarks that, 
"Precedents of this time show that the declarations in 
seduction cases described the daughter as a 'menial servant'", 
and he 45 cites the case of Bennett v Allcott to support this 
latter proposition. 
Concerning Taylor v ~eri, Windeyer J. 46 says "Until 
recently it [Taylor v Neri] has been seldom noticed judicially 
and then with dubious regard." And in respect of the form 
of declaration in Bennett v Allcott he says" ... far from 
being typical, the declaration there seems to be unique in 
using the words menial servant". In summarising his finding 
on whether authority supports Lord Denning's conclusion his 
Honour 47 concludes "Apart from the equivocal observations in 
Taylor v Neri and the unusual declaration in Bennett v Allcott 
no eighteenth century case seems to have been discovered to 
support the view of the Court of Appeal in Hambrook's case". 
·..1.:.n r UOd 
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The other judges comprising the majority of the High Court 
also support these conclusions. Kitto J. in regard to 
1 . .d4B Tay or v Neri sai "[I] n 1 795, if Espinasse is to be 
believed, Eyre C.J. said that he did not think the Court had ever 
gone further (in allowing a per quod action) than the case of 
a menial servant; but when it came to judgment he rested his 
decision on the broader ground that a person who had been 
injured by the defendant 'was not a servant at all' Even 
if taken at face value, this seems a somewhat rickety 
foundation for a conclusion that the common law gave the action 
per quod in respect of menial or domestic servants only 
Kitto J. further elaborates the doubt he expressed in the 
passage quoted above in relying on the reports of Espinasse 
II 
49 
as authority by quoting Lord Denman who compared Espinasse's 
Reports with Coke's Reports. That judge said: "Now they 
[Espinasse's Reports] are often cited as if counsel thought 
them of equal authority with Coke's Reports." Kitto J. 
observes that, "Lord Coke, as it happens, had spoken of the 
action per quod servitium amisit without any suggestion that 
it was or might be more narrowlycircumscribed than by the 
bounds of the relations of master and servant and in 
this he seems, so far as I can discover, to have been followed 
by every judge who dealt with the topic up to 1956 - that is, 
unless Eyre C.J. said what Espinasse Attributed to him." 
Menzies J. at p.437 says that" [T]he observations of 
Eyre C.J. in Taylor v Neri are expressed tentatively and if 
they mean that the action was confined to servants of the 
menial sort, they are not consistent with later statements 
made by great masters of the common law. That case stands 
alone and in the light of the cases before and after it, I can-
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not regard it as a foundation sufficient to support th 
conclusion that the action was so limited." Windeyer J makes 
the comment concerning the authority of Taylor v Neri "The 
decision of the Common Pl e as in Martinez v Gerber in 1841, may 
I think, be described as 'an authority long recognised as 
stating the law'. But surely the same cannot be said of 
Eyre C.J. in Taylor v Neri at nisi prius in 1795. 1151 
6. The nineteenth century 
Having sought to establish that the action per quod was 
restricted to menial servants in the eighteenth century Lord 
Denning then examines the rare nineteenth century authorities. 
52 In Hodsoll v Stallebrass the plaintiff's servant who was serving 
as an apprentice watch-maker was bitten by the defendant's 
dog. The plaintiff sought damages for the loss of the 
apprentice's services as a result of the injury. Lord Denning 
considers that this case did not depart from the view of the 
action which defined the scope of the action per quod as 
b . 1· . d d . 
53 e1ng 1m1te to omest1cs. He comes, next, to the case of 
. b 54 Martinez v Ger er , "which looks at first sight as if it was 
an extension; to the scope of the action as the Court of 
Appeal defines it. In that case, Goss, who was a servant and 
traveller of the plaintiffs was driving his horse and 'phaeton' 
along the highway when the defendant negligently ran into Goss 
with his gig and injured him. The plaintiffs sued for damages 
through the loss of Goss' services. Tindal C.J. held the 
defendant liable. Denning L.J. in Hambrook's case thought 
that it should be assumed that the servant lived in themaster's 
house, otherwise the case "would be an illegitimate extension 
of the law as it was understood by Eyre C.J." It has already 
been noted how Windeyer J regarded the decision of Martinez v 
d 
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55 
Gerber . As for the assumption that the servant must have 
lived in the master's house Taylor J. in Scott's case 
56 
says 
"With the greatest respect I find myself unable to make this 
assumption, particularly when I observe from the report of the 
case in the "LawJournal Reports' that the argument made the 
point that, consistently with the allegations made in the 
declaration, the injured servant might have been 'a traveller 
paid only for the journey when he performed.'" 
The majority in Scott's case sought additional support 
for their interpretation of Martinez v Gerber from a passage 
in the decision of the Privy Council, 57 Perpetual Trustees case . 
Lord Simonds, delivering the judgemtn of the Judicial Committee 
concluded: "The decision must, however, be regarded as 
establishing that at this date a person described as a servant 
and traveller stood in such a relationship as to support the 
action, and thus probably represents some advance from the 
limit suggested by Eyre C.J. (and set by the Court of Appeal in 
58 
Hambrook's case]" . Menzies J. in Scott's case regarded 
this statement "as plain recognition" that in the middle of 
the nineteenth century the law was as it appears from Martinez 
v Gerber." 
7. The Privy Council decision - the third ground 
The third main ground for his limiting the per quod action 
to menials Lord Denning purports to find in the Australian 
decision of the Privy Council, Attorney-General for New South 
Wales v Perpetual Trustee Co. 
59 
(Ltd) , 
case, The Commonwealth v Quince.
60 
and in the preceding 
The question which arose for decision in those cases was 
whether an employee of the Crown-in Quince's case, a member 
a 
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of the Armed Forces, and in the Perpetual Trustee case, a 
member of the police force - was a person in respect of whom 
an employer could recover damages against a negligent party 
who injured the employee for the loss of his services. The 
decision resolved itself on the point whether the employee 
could be described as a "servant" for the purposes of the 
action, i.e. whether he fitted into the "ordinary relationship 
of master and servant". It was held by the High Court in 
, I 61 , , Quince s case that the action per quod was not available to 
the Crown in respect of members of the Armed Forces because 
the relationship between those employees and the Crown was 
of a different than that of master and servant. The same 
' 1 I 62 court in Perpetua Trustees case followed Quince's case 
in holding that the action per quod was not available to the 
Crown in respect of a member of thePolice Force of New South 
Wales because there was no relationship of master and servant 
II in , , II 63 its strict sense . 
On appeal to the Privy Council the decision of the High 
Court was upheld on the ground that" constables do not 
fall into the class of servants the loss of whose services 
will give their 'employer' 64 a cause of action per quod" 
Viscount Simonds, delivering the judgment of the Committee 
found that the relation between the Crown and its employees 
II is not that of master and servant in the sense in which 
the terms are ordinarily 65 used." Later is said "[T]here is 
a fundamental difference between the domestic relation of 
servant and master and that of the holder of a public office 
and the state which he is bound to serve," 
66 
The relationship 
in the case before the Privy Council was found on the facts 
to fall within the latter category, so that it was held that 
d 
a r quod 
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the action per quad did not lie at the suit of the Crown. 
Denning L.J. in Hambrook's case in referring to the 
Perpetual Trustee decision, by implication, at least, found 
support in his holding the action to be limited to menial or 
domestic servants. He quotes a passage from the judgement 
where Viscount Simonds says that the action only lay in the 
realm of 'domestic relations" beyond which their Lordships 
were unwilling to see it extended. 
67 
Lord Denning defines 
those servants embraced by the phrase "domestic relations" 
as domestics or menials within the household of the master. 
And he held that the action does not lie where the relation-
ship of master and servant exists. According to his Lordship, 
if it did so lie, then, II there are many cases where the 
Crown 68 could sue." But in his opinion " ... the action does 
not lie wherever the relationship of master and servant exists. 
It only lies when the servant can properly be regarded as a 
member of the master's household, that is, as part of the 
family. A servant has long since ceased to be regarded as a 
slave." The court in the Commissioner of Railways v Scott 
held, however, that the Privy Council decision does not 
support Lord Denning's, and the Court of Appeal's decision 
in Hambrook's case. 
8. Scott's case 
In Scott's case the Commissioner for Railways on behalf 
of the Crown sought to recover damages in respect of an injured 
engine driver. The Crown on this occasion was successful; 
although the High Court followed the cases of Perpetual Trustee 
and Quince. The majority held that, on the facts, the 
relationship of master and servant existed; therefore, the 
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Crown could sue. In so holding, the High Court of Australia 
found that the action was available wherever the relationship 
of master and servant existed and was not confined to cases 
where the person injured was a domestic or menial servant. 
The Court pointed out, correctly, in the writer's opinion, 
that the Privy Council's decision was decided on the distinction 
between public officers and servants in the "ordinary 
relationship of master and servant, i.e. "do mestic relations". 
The Judicial Committee was adverting to this broad distinction 
when it referred to the passage from Blackstone's "Commentaries 1169 
which made the very same distinction - "Having thus commented 
on the rights and duties of persons , as standing in the 
public sphere of magistrates and people; the method I have 
carried out now leads me to consider the rights and duties in 
• • 1 • II 70 private economica relations According to the Privy Council 
it was in connexion with this latter subject that Blackstone 
" ... discourses on the relation of master and servant and, 
amongst other things, on the actions which a master may maintain 
in respect of his servant, including the form of action now 
under review.·• 
It has already been noted how the Privy Council regarded 
71 Martinez v Gerber as representing an advance on the law as 
stated by Eyre C.J. in Taylor v Neri, assuming that he was, 
indeed, correctly stating the law as it stood in the eighteenth 
century. , ' d , 7 2 ' I Viscount Simons cites Quinces case in support 
of the view that the master and servant relationship upon 
which the action per quad is said to rest is wholly different 
in kind from the relationship between the Crown and members 
of the armed forces or police constables. It can be seen, 
a 
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therefore, when Viscount Simonds refers to ''domestic relations" 
at p.490 of the report, this reference must be read in the 
context of the broad distinction the Privy Council was making 
between the 'ordinary' relationship of master and servant 
and the relation of a public nature which Blackstone mentioned. 
The relevant passage cannot reasonably be given the interpreta-
tion Denning L.J. attributed to it. He was relying on a 
different passage in Blackstone from thatwhich the Privy 
Council relied on. 
Lord Denning was on unstable ground when he cited Dixon 
C.J. in the High Court decision of Per p etual Trustee's case 
to support his restrictive definition of the scope of the per 
quad action. Dixon C.J. only concurred with the majority 
view that the action was not available to the Cro wn because 
he felt that the Court was bound to follow its own decisions, 
namely Quince's case. The oth e r judges did not share his 
view that had thematter been res integra the action would have 
lain in respect of the Crown whether the employment was of 
a public nature or not. On an historical examination Dixon C.J. 
did not find that the action per quad servitium amisit had at 
any stage been confined to menial servants. 
Windeyer J. could find "nothing which establishes that the 
action was available only in res p ect of servants of a low 
73 degree " Thi s judge commented at the endof hi s judgment 
that the limitation of the action per quod b y Lord Denning 
and the other two memb e rs of the Court of Ap peal in Hambrook's 
case II is not sup ported b y authority, logic, precedent or 
history. 1173 The writer sympathises with the sentiments 
exp ressed by Menzies J. that merely because the action may be 
anomalous in present day conditions of emp loyment that fact 
i:l 
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does not justify "judicial reduction" of a cause of action. 74 
9. Inconsistency 
The approach Lord Denning took towards the scope of the 
action in Hambrook's case seems plainly inconsistent with 
the statementjtie made, obiter, in an earlier decision reported 
in the same year as Hambrook's case. In Lee v Sheard he said
75 
in respect of the action per quod: "But that is a cause of 
action which is now in disfavour and must beAimited to cases 
of master and servant, and not extended to any new cases. 
That was so held by the Privy Council in Attorney-General for 
New South Wales v Perpetual Trustee Co. Ltd." This dicta, it 
is submitted, represents a correct statement of the law as 
found in the Privy Council case. But Lord Denning, in 
Hambrook's case held that the action was not even available as 
regards the ordinary relationship of master and servant, but 
only in respect of servants within the domestic household. 
10. Dicta 
Although it is probably true, owing to the public nature 
of B's employment (i.e. a civil servant), Hambrook's case 
would have been decided with the samefa"esult,had it come before 
the judges who decided Scott's case
76
, itwould, nevertheless 
be straining the meaning of "radio decidendi" 77 to suggest 
that what the Court of Appeal said in respect of the action 
being available only to menial servants was merely dicta; 
so that the House of Lords in a subsequentcase, while dis-
approving of what Lord Denning said in respect of the scope of 
the action, could, nevertheless, uphold the decision. Yet 
Lord Denning seemsto indicate in his judgement that a court in 
a subsequent case might do this if it disapproved of his 
definition of the scaope of the action. This would seem to 
cl 
~ 
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be the only reason for a rather feeble attempt to provide, in 
one sentence, an alternative ground for hisdecision. 
Having decided the case on the broad ground that the action 
only applied to menial or domestic servants, the alternative 
ground he provides is on the basis that the injured employee 
did not come within "the category of a servant to whom this 
cause of action applies. This appears to be a rather guarded 
acknowledgement of the ground u p on which Quince's case and 
the Privy Council's decision were decided. 
11. The New Zealand Decision 
In the recent New Zealand case, Attorney-General v Wilson 
78 and Horton Ltd. the Court of Appeal adopted the approach of 
the High Court in Scott's case towards the action p er quod, and 
in doing so a p proved of the majority judges' criticisms of 
Hambrook's 79 case The facts of the New Zealand case were 
similar to those in Scott. The injured employee was employed by 
the Railways Department as a forklift o p erator. 80 The Court 
affirmed the distinction made by the Privy Council between the 
ordinary relation of master and servant and that of a p ublic 
81 nature . On the facts, it held, as in Scott's case the relation 
between Crown and the injured employee fell into the former 
category. The Crown was unabl e to recover, however, because it 
was unable to prove calculable damages. 
12. Conclusion 
From the above examination of Hambrook's case, it would 
appeal that the Court of Ap p eal was led astray by Lord Denning 
in its finding as to what constitutes the scope of the action 
per quod servitium amisit. One would think, therefore, that the 
House of Lords might well refuse to adopt the view of the 
inferior court in a subsequent case, assuming that there is no 
intervening legislation concerning the action in the meantime. 
a 
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III AN ANOMALOUS ACTION 
A. Economic Loss. 
1. Reluctance to compensate for economic loss 
There has always been a reluctance amongst courts to 
award damages for purely economic loss 
. . 82 in tort actions. The 
action per quad has been regarded as an exception to this general 
rule. Starke J. in Commonwealth v Quince
83 
expressed this view : 
"Ordinarily one person has no claim against and cannot recover 
from another merely becuase that other person has committed a 
tort against a third person which indirectly injures the 
firstnamed 
84 
person." The judge then describes the action 
being an anomalous exception to the rule. 
2. The English Court of Appeal decisions 
h 
. . ,I.:, . . 8 5 Te maJority;uecision of the Court of Appeal in the 
as 
86 Sharton Steel case followed an earlier decision of thesame 
87 court. The facts in both cases are similar. In both cases 
the defendants had negligently severed power cables which caused 
the power to theplaintiffs' factoriesto be cut off and were 
held to have breached duties of care to the res p ective plaintiffs. 
The question of law in both cases was what could be claimed as 
permissible heads of damage. In SCM v Whitta1
88 
the plaintiffs 
claimed damages for loss caused by damageto their machinery 
and the consequential loss of profit asa result of the defendants 
negligently severing the cable, but not the 'pure ' economic 
loss which resulted from shutting down the factory. In the 
Spartan Steel case the plaintiffs managed to avoid much physical 
damage to their furnaces so that the physical damage plus loss 
of profit consequent thereon was far less than the pure economic 
loss which they sought to recover as well. 
a 
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The court in the latter case followed SCM v Whittal, in 
particular, the dicta of Lord Denning, in holding that only 
economic damage consequent on physical damage was recoverable, 
but not the pure economic loss consisting of the loss of profits 
which resulted from shutting down the factory. The ingenious 
Lord Denning says the reason for the distinction between the two 
types of economic loss is based on policy. 89 In stating this 
he was following his own dicta in SCM v Whittal where he had 
.d9o Sal : "In actions of negligence, when the plaintiff has 
suffered no damage to his person orproperty, but has only 
sustained economic loss, the law does not usually permit him to 
recover that loss. The reason lies in public policy. It was 
first stated by Blackburn J. in Cottle v Stockton Waterworks Co., 
and has been repeated many times since." According to Lord 
Denning the wayin which the courts give effect to this public 
policy of restricting the type of damages which are recoverable 
is by declaring certain kinds of damages to be too remote. 
"At bottom," his Lordship states, "I think the question of 
recovering economic loss is one of policy. Whenever the courts 
draw a line to mark out the bounds of duty, they do it as a 
matter of policy to limit the responsibility of the defendant. 
Whenever the courts set bounds to the damages recoverable -
saying that they are, or are not, too remote - theydo it as 
91 a matter of policy so as to limit the liability of the defendant." 
In other words, in Lord Denning's view, one cannot logically 
reconcile the cases on liability purely by reference to duty of 
f b ·1· 92 h d 1 b 
care and orseea 1 ity, or t e cases on amages pure y y 
. f f b'l' 93 reference to ideas o remoteness and orseea 1 ity. These 
ostensible grounds upon which cases are decided are really based 
. . 94 on public policy. 
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It is rather interesting, and, perhaps, significant to 
h . d. . h ++ f note tat in iscussing t e mavfer o damages, Denning L.J. in 
h
. 95 SCM v W ittal dared to suggest that, in Hambrook's case, 
concerning the action per quod the employer could not recover 
damages for the loss of services of the employee because such 
damage was too remote, thereby implying the decision was really 
grounded in public policy - that pure economic loss should not 
be recoverable. Lord Denning said: "Suppose next, that the 
servant isinjured and the employer is not, but the employer 
suffers damage owing to the loss of his services. He cannot 
recover from the wrongdoer: see Inland Revenue Commissioners 
96 v Hambrook." And later, referring, inter alia to the case 
of an employer losing the services of his employee he stated: 
"If you refuse to allow the plaintiff in such cases to recover 
for economic loss, it is not because there is no duty owed to 
him, nor becuase it was not caused bythe negligence of the 
defendant, but simply, becuase it is too remote to be recovered as 
a head of 97 damage" [Emphasis added] 
Now, with due respect to the learned judge, to include 
Hambrook's case in the above statement is plainly misleading. 
To begin with, there was no question of damages involved in 
Hambrook's case and, therefore,to suggest the ground for the 
decision was one of remoteness of damage is absurd. That 
decision, as his Lordship would have been well aware, was 
decided on the basis that the action per quod was available only 
in respect of menial 98 h' h servants; t is waste reason why, in 
Hambrook's case the employee could not recover damages. In fact, 
the learned judge in the latter case, expressly adverted to the 
possibility of an employer recovering damages (which would be 
purely economic loss) 
~ 
by pr~ffly stating the criteria for 
' ' ' ,. ... . er-~ 0 fa univt:!f'' 1 · • 
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measuring such damages, "supposing the action did lie. 1199 
The reason for the action per quod is based, not on notions 
of duty of care and forseeability, but on the idea that a master 
had a quasi-proprietary interest in the services of his servant, 
and damages resulted from wrongful interference with such 
services. 
3. The dicta of Speight J. 
Speight J. in Attorney-General v Wilson and Horton after 
agreeing with Richmond J. on the general approach to be taken 
1 in relation to the question of damages, states: "I concur with 
the observations of Richmond J but I add that not all loss 
suffered consequent upon the absence of the employee will be 
recoverable. For, if the damages canvassed by Turner P. and 
Richmond J. were not enough, one contemplates with apprehension 
problems of remoteness of damage, especially in the field of 
economic loss. If losses accrue or profits diminish is there 
any distinction when they are occasioned by loss of a servant's 
special skill as against loss of electric power from a severed 
II 2 
cab le? 
We have seen that the damages recoverable in the action 
per quod constitute an exception to the general rule economic 
loss is not generally permissible as a head of damages. One 
cannot say, therefore, as Mr Justice Speight appears to say 
that it is anomalous to allow such damages under the action per 
quod. It is wrong, the writer submits, to apply those 
principles founded in negligence such as duty of care to the 
action per quod which is founded in trespass or interference 
with the services of an employee, on the matter of damages. 
If one accepts the basis for recovery of damages under the 
action per quod as enunciated by Richmond J.
2
a no question of 
d 
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remoteness or forseeability can arise. 
It may be true that there is no distinction between losses 
which have accrued or profits which have diminished as the 
result of loss of power from a severed cable, and those which 
have resulted from the loss of a servant's special skill. But 
the dilemna posed here, disappears once it is realised that 
damages are assessed on a different basis in negligence actions, 
on the one hand, and under the action per quad, on the other. 
Once it has been established that some loss (which may include 
lost profits) is directly consequential on the loss of services 
(but only on the loss of services), then, it is irrelevant 
that the type of damage was not forseeable. If the courts 
wish to restrict the recovery of economic loss in the action 
per quad on the grounds of public policy they ought not to do 
3 so by declaring the damages sought to be too remote. Lord 
Denning in SCM v Whittal tried to suggest that, in fact, this 
was the basis for the decision in Hambrook's case. It was 
mentioned earlier that it was perhaps, significant that he 
should make such a statement. The reason for this statement 
may be that although it is quite plain from the examination of 
Hambrook's case that the decision was not based on remoteness 
of damages, the underlying reason for restricting the action in 
the manner he did, was one of public policy. This might also 
explain the conclusions reached from hishistorical survey, and 
the definition of the action's foundation in that case. 
B. Contributory Negligence. 
1. Lord Denning ' s "anomaly" 
In Hambrook ' s case, Lord Denning argues that one of the 
anomalies which results from the action per quad arises in the 
situation where 
negligent. The 
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the employee has been contributorily 
anomaly , his Lordship asserts, is that the 
employer in an action for loss of services does not have his 
damages reduced. He says that this anomalous situation is the 
result of treating the servant or employee as a chattel, and 
he gives an illustration: 
"If the owner of a motor-car sends it out with a 
driver and while he is driving in the course of 
his employment, the car is damaged in a collision 
by the fault of both drivers, the owner must take 
responsibility for his own driver ' s negligence. He 
only gets reduced damages . But if the driver takes 
the car out "on a frolic of his own " , outside the 
course of his employment, the owner recovers full 
damages for thecar because he is not then responsible 
for the driver's negligence. 114 
Lord Denning distinguishes two situations. The first is 
where the employee was acting outside the course of his 
employment - on a 'frolic' of his own. In this situation the 
master can recover the full amount of damages which represents 
the damage done to his vehicle. The other situation is where 
the employee was acting in the course of his employment at 
the relevant time, in which case the employer's damages are 
reduced according to the extent of his employee's negligence. 
According to Denning L.J. the Crown's position in the case 
before him was analagous to the former of the two situations. 
Providing the action was available to it, the Crown would be 
able to recover in full from the defendant despite B ' s 
contributory negligence, becuase he was on a frolic of his own 
at the relevant time. 
a 
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2. Criticism of the contributory negligence anomaly 
Two basic points can be made in relation to the 'anomaly' 
concerning contributory and the action per quad. Firstly, if, 
5 
as has been suggested above, the action is based, not on a 
proprietary right which the master had in his servant, but on 
the quasi-proprietary interest in the services of the servant, 
the fact that the employer can recover in full despite 
contributory negligence on the part of his employee cannot be 
the result of his servant being treated as a chattel. It is 
simply because the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 
(U.K.) 1945 does not embrace the action per quad. This 
anomaly is easily remediable by legislation. "Any anomaly 
which exists in respect of contributory negligence is not so 
much on account of any notion upon which the action is based, 
as the result of "recent statute law." 
Secondly, even if the basis of the action was founded upon 
a proprietary notion, the illustration Lord Denning gives 
concerning contributory negligence and itscomparison with the 
results arrived at by allowing the action per quad, is basically 
mis conceived and inapt. Even if the employer 's servant is on a 
frolic of his own the employer still cannot recover in full for 
damage to his vehicle from the negligent third party where the 
employee has been contributorily negligent. Only by joining 
the employee as defendant would he recover in full. Whether 
the employee was on a frolic of his own at the time of the 
accident is irrelevant to the q uestion of whether the employer 
can recover against the third party. 
In giving his illustration, Lord Denning has confused two 
situations; one, where there has been personal injury, the 
other where there has been damage to property. In the former 
d 
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situation, when the third party has been injured, partly 
through his own negligence and partly becuase of the negligence 
of an employee, the question whether tho/employee was on a 
frolic of his own is relevant to the matter of the employer ' s 
vicarious liability. But whether an employee who was in 
control of the master's e.g. vehicle was acting in the course 
of his employment is quite irrelevant as regards the liability 
of the third party whom the master is suing for negligently 
damaging his vehicle. Neither in Lord Goddard's judgment at 
first instance, nor in Lord Parker's (Birkett L.J. did not find 
it necessary to consider the matter) was there a suggestion 
that, whether B was on a frolic of his own or not could in any 
way affect the question of contributory negligence. 
A possible reason why the employer's ability to recover 
damages under the action per quod has not been affected by 
contributory negligence is that originally the action was in the 
form of trespass, e.g. to the person by maiming or assault, and 
notions of negligence or duty of care are concepts which arose 
much later. In an action in trespass damage is the gist of the 
action. Once a trespass is shown to have been committed, fault, 
thereafter, becomes irrelevant and the damage consequent on the 
trespass becomes the sole issue. The particular consequence in 
issue under the action per quod had to flow from the loss of 
services of the servant. Thus, the very nature of the action 
does not easily enable notions involving fault, such as 
negligence which can be shared, to be applied to the ancient 
cause of action. 
C. Modern Notions of Employment. 
In the examination of the historical basis of the action 
per quod and of Hambrook ' s case, it has been suggested that the 
basis upon which Lord Denning criticised the action per quod 
Id 
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servitium amisit - that the master had a proprietary interest 
in the person of the servant - is unfounded. But that does not 
answer the overwhelming (though not unanimous) view of the 
courts in England, Australia and New Zealand that the action 
is anomalous under present day conditions because the notion 
upon which the action is said to be based - that an employer 
has a quasi-proprietary interest in the services of his 
6 employee - isno longer in accord with modern ideas of 
employment. 
Criticism fromthe courts began as early as 1916 with the 
House of Lords in Admiralty Commissioners v. S.S. Amerika. 
d . 7 Lor Sumner said : "Indeed, what is anomalous about the action 
per quad servitium is not that it does not extend to the loss of 
service in the event of the servant being killed,
8 
but that it 
should exist at all. It appears to be a survival from the time 
when service was a status." 
While some judges are prepared to resort to "Judicial 
reduction" of the action because of its 'anomalous' nature, 
the Court of Appeal in New Zealand, in considering it to be 
"anomalous in the extreme" called upon Parliament to consider 
abolishing the . 9 action. The President of the Court of Appeal, 
Mr Justice Turner stated in the Attorney-General v Wilson and 
10 Horton : "I echo, after forty six years, the observations of 
11 Lord Sumner with which I began this judgment. Their force 
has increased rather than diminished during the half-century 
which has all but elapsed since their utterance." His Honour 
implored the legislature to consider abolishing the action, 
al though he "would not go so far asLord Denning did or F u /logor J 
II (who would have held that the action was not available to 
the Crown, even if Quince's case had been wrongly decided). He 
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"unwilling to agree to legislating" to abolish or "arbitrarily 
limit, a cause of action which must be recognised as an 
e stab li shed part ... " 12 of New Zealand law. 
Windeyer J has challenged the argument that because the 
action per quod is based on notions in respect of employment 
which are out of date the action itself is, therefore, "out of 
harmony with the economic and social conditions of 13 today." 
As to this conclusion he boldly replies: "This seems to me to 
be, in the abstract, a questionable assertion, especially if 
by such an action an employer is entitled to recover from the 
wrongdoer medical expenses he paid for and wages he paid to an 
injured servant during his absence from duty." And continuing 
his Honour said: "[A]ssuming medical expenses and sick pay, 
to be recoverable, this seems to me not inconsistent with the 
social and industrial conditions of today. An employer's 
right to be indemnified by a wrongdoer for expenses he has 
been put to because of the injury of his employee is well 
recognised in workman's compensation law." He makes the point 
that, in the case before him, had the appellant claimed under 
the Workman's Compensation Act (N.S.W.) he would have been able 
to recover the amount claimed, "And no-one would have 
thought this was out of harmony with modern conditions. 1114 
D. Damages 
1. The 'anomalous' action and damages 
A point which emerges from the kind of argument which 
Windeyer J. put forward is that the answer to the question 
whether the action per quod is anomalous, in that it serves 
no useful socio-economic purpose, depends upon the type of 
damages which are recoverable by the employer once he has 
established that the action does not against the tortfeasor 
Q. Th ction f8r quod 
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who injured his (the employer ' s) employee. Yet, most of the 
authorities have devoted little attention to the matter of 
damages and when they have it has been in an inconsistent manner. 
Richmond J. in theNew Zealand decision has provided a clear 
and comprehensive summary of the question of damages and it is 
considered below. 
2. The four approaches 
15 In Attorney-General v Wilson and Horton Ltd. the Crown 
was seeking to recover "make-up" pay which represented the 
amount required to bring H's payments up to the sum which he 
would have received if there had been no accident , i.e. the 
difference between Workers' Compensation together with 
various expenses met by the Crown (which sums had been settled 
between the parties), and the total amount he would have received 
had he not been injured. Richmond J said that "One would regard 
this "make-up" pay either as sick pay or accident pay or part 
payment of wages. The problem would be the same if an 
employer continued full payment of wages to an injured employee." 
The learned judge regarded the cases as having approached the 
matter of make-up pay infour different ways: 
(1) Make-up pay can in certain circumstances be recovered 
in an action~ quod as a "distinct and permissible" head of 
damages - but only where the employer is under a legal 
16 obligation to make such payments. In the S.S. Amerika 17 case ------------
Lord Sumner considered that payment of such wages was not re-
coverable because damages must be measured by the value of the 
employee ' s services lost and not by the "incidents of his 
remuneration under 18 the terms of his contract of employment." 
The paymentof such wages, according to his Lordship results 
from the pre-existing obligation to pay under the contract of 
employment and not from the loss of services. Richmond J. notes 
:>d 
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that on this first approach where wages paid for no return 
are recoverable as such, damages are regarded as consequential 
on the loss of servitium. 
(2) The second approach is said to be found in the 
judgment of Latham C.J. "and some of the other members of the 
High Court in Commonwealth v Quince II - "The question which 
arises in relation to pay is whether it was reasonable to pay 
these moneys, for which no service was received, and whether 
they were so paid, that is, paid without service being 
rendered, in consequence of the defendant's tort A master 
is not bound to dismiss a servant as soon as he is injured and 
to leave him to the mercies of charity. He is entitled to 
behave reasonably, and the payment of his wages for a period 
while an attempt is being made to restore him to health is a 
proper head of 19 damage." Richmond J. pointed out that it 
is not quite clear whether this is the same view as expressed 
. 2 0 by McKinnon J. who seemed to say that wages paid for nothing 
were recoverable if "reasonably and necessarily, but not 
voluntarily incurred," or whether "it is founded on the general 
principle that moneys reasonably expended in an attempt to 
mitigate loss are themselves recov e rable 21 as damages", 
although voluntarily incurred. 
(3) The third approach is to treat the payments to an 
employee as "some evidence" of the value of the "services lost", 
and, on that basis, recoverable. This is the approach adopted 
by Denning and Parker L.J.J. in Hambrook's case. Lord Parker 
22 asserted: "I am, however, inclined to think that they could 
claim that amount, not because it represents sick pay but 
because it is some criterion by which the loss of services 
could be measured. If instead of taking on and training a new 
)d 
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servant the master reasonably chooses to keep on the injured 
servant and to pay him, it seems to me that the sums so paid, 
assuming they are reasonable, are some measure of the value 
f h
. . ,. 22 
o is services. 
(4) The fourth approach is that which takes the measure 
of damages to be "the pecuniary loss actuafly sustained through 
the loss of services of the servant," which is not the same 
thing as wages paid to the employer for no return. Nor are 
wages paid for nothing even prima facie evidence of this 
. l 23 pecuniary oss. 
3 . The correct approach 
In order to ascertain what was the correct approach 
Richmond J . examined the true nature of the action per quod. 
A Court of Appeal decision, National Insurance Co. of New 
1 d · . d 
24 . f d Zea an Limite v Jayes is re erre to. In the course of 
deciding a claim against an insurance company, the Court had 
to consider the nature of the action per quod. This was because 
there was a question as to whether the indemnity against an 
owner's liability for injury to a third party in a motor 
vehicle accident extended to indemnifying him against liability 
for damages per quod servitium amisit . The Motor Vehicle 
Insurance (Third Party Risks) Act 1928 provided an indemnity 
against owners' liability to pay damages "on account of the 
death of or of bodily injury to any person or persons." The 
court agreed, unanimously, that the indemnity did not extend 
to damages per quod. In respect of the old form of action 
Myers C.J. said,
25 
in a passage cited by Richmond J,: "The 
master's cause of action arises 'because of' or by 'reason of ' 
the loss of service, and not the servant's bodily injury." 
Richmond J. then adverts to the conclusion reached by Turner P. 
that the remedies of a master in respect of hi~servants were 
od 
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based on the idea that the master had a quasi-proprietary 
interest in his se r vant ' s services "and not upon any notion 
that he had some form of proprietary interest in the servant 
himself. 1126 
27 His honour concludes that the wrong done in an action 
per quod is the interference with the right to the services 
of his servant and that, accordingly, the damages recoverable 
"should be measured exclusively by the consequences which 
follow from that interference." [Emphasis added ], and not 
from all the consequences which "follow merely from the fact 
that the servant was injured Put in another way , the real 
damage suffered by the master can be determined only by inquiry 
as to the extent by whichthe master is worse off as a 
result of his being deprived of his servant's services than 
he would have been had those , , II 28 services continued. This 
approach, says Richmond J, is essentially the same as that 
of Fullagar J (the fourth approach described above); that 
the measure of damages should be the pecuniary loss actually 
sustained through the loss of services. But the New Zealand 
judge thought that, in addition, damages for inconvenience 
. l 29 could also be inc uded. The learned judge also agreed 
with Fallagar Jin treating medical and hospital expenses 
recoverable under a separate principle of law from the action 
per quod, but thought that they may be regarded as consequential 
on the loss of services if incurred to mitigate the loss. 
The "value of the services lost" test expressed in 
Hambrook's case was seen by Richmond J as directing attention 
away from the real issue in the damages inquiry. He considered 
(rightly , in the writer ' s view) that the judges who have 
employed this test have not appreciated the difference between 
od 
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describing the damages recoverable as being the value of the 
services lost - to be measured, therefore, prima facie by 
wages paid for no return , as being some criterion by which 
to measure the value of the services lost - and describing 
them as a measure of the value of the damage caused to the 
employer as a consequence of the loss of services. The latter 
approach is the correct one having regard to the true nature 
of the action. 
The reason for making this "subtle" distinction is that 
the value of the employee's which have been lost is not 
necessarily the measure of the loss or damage to the employer 
occasioned by the loss of services, because those services 
which are no longer rendered by the employee (whose services 
are lost) may be rendered by other employees or by a substitute. 
If the services are performed by co-employees, the measure 
of the loss will be the overtime paid to them, if in fact, 
such payments are made, otherwise the employer will have 
suffered no (pecuniary) loss. If the lost services are 
performed by a substitute, then the measure of the loss is 
the wages paid to the substitute (providing the employer 
continues to pay the injured employee whose services he has 
lost). 
Although wages paid for no return are not recoverable as 
such, nevertheless, in the opinion of Richmond J they may be 
recovered 30 if reasonably made to mitigate the employer ' s loss 
(approach (2) ante). His Honour stated, obiter, that because 
damages are assessed on the assumption that had the employee's 
services continued so also would his wages have continued, 
any savings in wages which the employer "has or ought reasonably 
to have made after his employee was injured" should be set off 
tod 
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against the damages prima facie suffered by the employer 
h h h l f h 
. 31 t roug t e oss o t e services. Workers Compensation 
payments should be regarded as savings. The true measure, 
then, of the damage suffered by the employer "must be 
determined by enquiring to what extent, if any, his position 
over all has been rendered worse as a result of the loss of 
his employee's services than it would have been if those 
services had continued in the normal 32 way." 
4. Damages in the New Zealand Decision 
On the facts before him, Richmond J held that the make-up 
payment made by the Railways Departmentpursuant to a 
discretion under section 49A of Principle Order No. 161 was 
a "voluntary" payment and was not recoverable as an item of 
d . . . h 33 amage in its own rig t. As the ground had not been pleaded 
the Crown could not recover on the basis that it was expendi-
34 ture reasonably incurred in order to mitigate theloss. 
Counsel for the Crown had urged the Court to treat the make-up 
pay as evidence of the value of the services 35 lost. For the 
reasons discussed above in relation to the third approach 
Richmond J. held that it could not be treated in this way and 
felt that the case before him was one where the remaining 
staff of the employer had absorbed theduties normally carried 
out by H. The only loss that the Crown could recover was 
overtime for the extra work.
35 
But, because they were not 
capable of assessment - the records of the department were 
not able to provide sufficient information on which to base 
calculations - no damages could be quantified. "In any event," 
his Honour concluded, "I would expect it to have been less in 
amount than the sum of $2,268 paid as workers compensation and 
fod 
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While not prepared to express formal approval of the 
whole of the judgement of Richmond J, Turner P concurred 
in the conclusion and the approach adopted to reach that 
conclusion, i.e. that the question of damages involves inquiry 
as to what is the overall loss to theemployer, measured by 
placing a value on the services which he has lost. 1137 
According to the President of the Court of Appeal, in the case 
of a single employer and a single employee the cost of 
employing a substitute would represent the prima facie value 
of the loss of services; but along with Richmond J the learned 
judge regarded the instant case as one where the other employees 
had been able to "take up the slack." So that the work which 
the employee, whose services the master had lost, had been 
doing was continued, "doubtless at some inconvenience to a 
number of people, but in a manner in which it is impossible 
to contend that the master had fared worse than would have 
been the case had the servant never been injured at all. 1138 
He held that there was no proof of extra payment for the extra 
work performed by the other employees' hence, the employer 
did not have a good claim in that respect. Turner P held that 
it was not possible to quantify in money any inconvenience 
suffered by the plaintiff and in doing so appears to implicitly 
agree with Richmond J that inconvenience constitutes a 
39 permissible head of damage. 
4. Summary of the New Zealand approach 
To summarise the general approach of the New Zealand Court 
of Appeal towards the matter of damages in the action per quad 
servitium amisit, we can say that the inquiry must be directed 
to the pecuniary loss ( . . 40) and inconvenience suffered by the 
od 
/ 
Ca 
- 38 -
employer as a consequence, only of the loss of servicesof 
the employee. Wages paid for no return are not recoverable as 
such. Payments made voluntarily or gratuitously are not 
recoverable in their own right. However, payments may be 
treated as consequential on the loss of services if reasonably 
made in orderto mitigate such loss, even voluntarily made.
41 
The measure of the extent to which the employer has overall 
become worse off as a result of the loss of services of the 
employee (another way of saying the damage consequential on 
the loss of services) may be the amount paid to a substitute, 
or if the work normally rendered by the injured employee is 
absorbed by fellow-employees, the extra payments made to the 
latter to "take up the slack." In both cases, any savings 
the employer has or ought reasonably to have made as a result 
of his employee being off work must be set off against such 
payments for replacement services. The obvious case where 
an employer makes a saving is when he is indemnified out of 
Worker's compensation. 
IV THE FUTURE OF THE ACTION 
A. The Position in England 
On the assumption that the correct approach on the matter 
of damages was that enunciated by the Court of Appeal in 
Attorney-General v Wilson and Horton, i.e. that the "gist" 
of the action is the loss f . 42 h o service, not t e services lost, 
damages being assessed accordingly, would the House of Lords 
adopt this approach? If it is accepted would the action still 
be considered anomalous? Notwithstanding the basis of the 
action may be anomalous, does itstill perform a useful function, 
today; and if it does, would it continue to do so if the House 
of Lords were to adopt the New Zealand approach in relation to 
od 
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damages? In the course of this part of the article , the 
writer will endeavour to provide answers to these questions. 
1. New justification for an old rule 
In an article, "Lawyers ' Uses of Legal History, 1143 
Professor Enid Camptbell points out
44 
that, "Although the 
original justification for a legal rule may have disappeared 
a new justification may have taken its place. A rule created 
for one purpose may in time come to serve another purpose, 
agreeable to present day needs. " Campbell takes as a 
particular example the action per quod, itself, which has 
managed to survive centuries. 
. 45 h h h . Windeyer J t oug t tat the action per quod serves a 
purpose agreeable to present day needs by allowing an 
employer recovery of medical and hospital expenses which could 
1 b d d k . 1 . 1 . 46 a so e recovere un er wor ers compensation egis ation. 
h 1 . h .. 47 . f Te Eng is Law Commission has given a reason or 
regarding the action per quod as fulfilling a modern function. 
The action, in England, allows the employer recovery from a 
fortfeasor of damages, which the tortfeasor is relieved from 
paying when the employee, whom the wrongdoer has negligently 
injured, sues to recover damages in a negligence action. 
This result is achieved, however, by the courts adopting the 
"value of the services lost" test mentioned in Hambrook's 
case, . . . f h 48 and by treating wages as some criterion or tat test . 
2. A caution 
. 49 d h The Law Reform Committee an t e Law Commission in its 
Working Paper
50 
have both considered whether or not the old 
common law actions for loss of services, loss of consortium, 
seduction and enticement ought to be abolished. Both bodies 
considered that they should be abolished. The Law Commission, 
uod 
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however, issued this warning: "Our provisional opinion is 
that the ancient common law remedies, though they are 
inadequate and in some respects clearly do not reflect social 
assumptions which are no longer acceptable cannot safely be 
swept away II until, in respect of the action per quod, 
it is considered whether the employer "should have a remedy 
against the tortfeasor in respectof wages paid to the victims 
of his tort, his employee , during the period of incapacity -
and the scope of any such 51 remedy." 
3. The Law Commission's Interpretation of Hambrook~ case 
The Commission referred to Hambrook's case as representing 
the present scope of the action in England, i.e. confined to 
menial servants. Moreover, i·t 52 h .. accepts tat decision as good 
law which would be followed by the House of Lords. The Law 
Commission glosses over the criticisms of Hambrook's case 
found in Scott's case by merely stating that "This restriction 
has not yet been adopted by the High Court of Australia 
[Emphasis added] as though it will be just a matter of time 
II 5 3 
before the Australian courts adopt Lord Denning's restriction 
of the action. But it is clear from our examination of the 
decision in the latter case that only legislation could 
restrict the scope of th e action in the manner in which the 
English Court of Appeal has 
54 so done. The question which the 
House of Lords may be asked to decide is, not whether to 
"extend" the action to any case of master and servant, but 
whether the restriction of the action to menial servants in 
Hambrook's case is the correct view of the law. In the light 
of Scott's case the Privy Council decision 55 in Perpetual Trustees 
and more recently Attorney-General v Wilson and Horton, the 
latter course would be the correct approach to take. If the 
uod 
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House of Lords were to do so, then, according to the Law 
Commission the action would be sufficiently wide in scope 
to enable it "to play a role in the economic life of the 20th 
56 century" , by allowing an employer to recover the amount by 
which the tortfeasor's liability to the injured employee has 
been reduced by the employer continuing to pay wages to the 
employee. 
4. A matter of justice 
At para. 9 of the Working P 3. p er the Commission said: "We 
think it would generally be accepted that there can at the 
present time be little pstification for entitling an emp loyer 
to a remedy merely because someone's wrongful act has deprived 
the employer , temporarily, or permanently, of the services of 
his emp loyee." It regarded the loss of services of an 
employee as a normal risk, which an employer accepts these 
days, one which he can insure against. It considered that 
there was no justification for retaining the action merely in 
order to compensate an employer for such loss. But the 
Commission did consider it unjust that, by virtue of an employer 
continuing to pay wages while an employee is injured, a 
tortfeasor should thereby have his liability reduced and that 
if the action per quod remedied this injustice whereby an 
employer subsidises the tortfeasor's liability, it is worth-
while retaining the action. This "injustice" has arisen by 
the adhereing strictly to the compensatory principle often 
. . . . 1 . 57 h said to be the basis of damages in civi actions Te 
position in England is that if an employee is entitled to 
receive wages or a pension during his absence from work because 
of an injury, in his claim against a tortfeasor he must give 
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. 58 credit for those amounts. The Commission considers that 
the beneficial result of allowing actions per quad, "if it is 
extended beyond the realm of menial servants" (or more 
correctly, if the true scope of the action is not limited to 
59 the realm of menial servants ) , is that it enables the 
employer to recover from the tortfeasor wages and other benefits 
paid to the employee "thereby counterbalancing the reduction 
of the amount of damages payable to the victim of the tort 
by the 60 tortfeasor." 
5. Damages - the Law Commission's approach 
The Commission does not accept the approach of the Court 
of Appeal in New Zealand as regards damages because such an 
approach might prevent the above 'just' result being achieved 
- "It might be thought that in an action for loss of services 
the damages should be measured by the cost of replacing the 
services rather than by the wages paid to the injured servant.", 
i.e. damages should be measured by the damage consequential 
on the loss of services not by the value of the services lost. 
But the Commission seems to think that such an approach is 
"'more appealing to the literal-minded than to those with a 
teleological concern with purposes and means to achieve 
desirable ends. 111 • 61 In other words, like Windeyer J and 
Dixon C.J. in Scott's case the Commission considers that so 
long as the action per quad is able to fulfill a modern 
function by the type of relied it can offer, it matters not 
that the reasons u pon which the action was originally founded 
are no longer valid, nor if that relief given does not result 
directly from the nature of the action. 
One of the rare English cases involving the per quad action 
in the twentieth century, which supported the view that wages 
Ca. 
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could be some evidence of the value of the services lost, but 
62 were not recoverable as a distinct head of damage. But 
it is the writer's opinion that the courts in England need not 
depart from the approach of Richmond J, which appears to be 
the strictly correct one, if they were to treat wages, even 
although voluntarily paid as a reasonable attempt to mitigate 
loss, and thereby consequential on the loss of services. It 
seems hard to imagine a situation where it would not be 
'reasonable' for an employer to pay wages while the employee 
is off work. If the Commission had considered this line of 
approach, it would not have needed to defend itself against 
h · f 63 h . f . h 
t e view o Lord Sumner on t e question o measuring t e 
damages by wages paid with the statement that, "It smacks of 
legal pedantry to argue that the loss borne by the employer 
flows, not from tort, but from the employer's own generosity 
or contract and that the tort is not the causa causans but 
only the causa sine qua non of the 64 loss" (i.e. that wages 
paid for no return result not from the loss of service but 
from the voluntary act of the employer or from a pre-existing 
term in the contract of employment to pay wages). 
6. Proposal for Reform 
Whichever way the Law Commission thought the matter of 
damages should be approached, because it held the view that 
the House of Lords would probably follow Hambrook's case as 
regards the scope of the action, it considered the ambit of the 
action would be too narrowly circumscribed to serve any useful 
purpose as far as rectifying the unjust situation described 
above. The Commission, therefore, recommended the abolition 
of the action per quod, but also recommended the consideration 
of a remedy to compensate the emp loyer for the wages paid 
riuod 
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which subsidise the tortfeasor ' s liability. Without going 
into all the types of remedies canvassed , the Commission ' s 
provisional recommendation was that an employer should be 
allowed indirectly to recover from the tortfeasor by means 
of the employee ' s action, damages which include inter alia 
wages paid by the employer while the employee is incapacitated 65 . 
This proposal differed from the Law Reform Committee's 
recommendation that a direct action against the Tortfeasor be 
66 given to the employer. Lack of information and unanimity 
amongst interested parties as to the type of remedy which 
should replace the per quad action meant that proposals were 
only tentative. Six years after the Working Paper of the Law 
Commissionwas published there has been no further moves to 
abolish the action, nor to the writer's knowledge, have there 
been any indications that legislation is imminent. 
B. The Position in New Zealand 
It is 67 quite clear after the amendment to the Accident 
Compensation Act 1972 that the cause of action per quad 
servitium amisit is no longer available to an employer in 
New Zealand . One might, perhaps, wonder whether the legislature 
68 has been too hasty in heeding the call of the Court of Ap p eal 
to abolish theaction. It is true that, because an employee 
under the earners ' scheme in the Act no longer has a direct 
action against the tortfeasor who negligently injured him, 
the situation described by the LawCommission (which also 
applied in New Zealand) whereby the tortfeasor's liability 
69 was reduced at the expense of the employer, no longer arises. 
Now, even if one accepts that it is desirable that an 
employer, under the Act should pay the wages of the first 
quod 
Ca 
- 45 -
week of his employee's incapacity,
70 
excepting that fact, 
there will still be situations where an employer suffers 
loss through losing the services of his employee where it 
might be considered proper that the employer should be 
compensated for such loss. Even if one regards the notion 
that an employer has a quasi-proprietary interest in the 
services of his employee is anomalous, that does not prevent 
one from saying that an employer should be compensated for 
the damage caused to him through the loss of those services. 
As the Court of Appeal pointed out, an employer of a reasonably 
large work force suffers only minimal loss by one employee 
being incapacitated, because the other employees "take up 
71 the slack." But what of the small family business, or the 
small employer, who loses an employee's services which are 
vital to the economic running of the business, and are not 
easily replaceable; for instance, highly developed technical 
skills? In the case of a large and wealthy employer, 
substantial damage may, nevertheless be incurred; but for 
the small family business even the temp orary loss of that 
employee's services may have a disastrous effect on the 
viability of the business. It would, perhaps, be anomalous 
if an employer were still able to sue the tortfeasor because 
his negligence indirectly caused damag e to the employer, 
while the employee who is directly injured has, now, no 
action against the tortfeasor. Yet, for the same reasons why 
an injured employee is compensated under the Accident 
Compensation Act in the manner provided, i.e. that it is in 
the interests of society that the community as a whole should 
bear that responsibility, ought not the employer also be 
compensated in the same way? It may be possible for the 
quod 
• 
Ca Th ction per q ·od 
... ._ __ ,a._ 
- 46 -
larger employer to insure against the type of loss we are 
discussing but for the smaller employer it is often just 
not feasible. 
In conclusion , it can be said that while under our 
legislation theemployee has been well taken care of, it has 
neglected to provide for an employer what might be regarded 
as a desirable remedy; yet by aboli s hing the action per quod 
servitium amisit , has closed the door on one means of 
p roviding such a r e medy. It ma y be that Parliament should 
give consideration to p roviding for the situation where an 
employer suffers economic loss through the loss of servic e s 
of his employee. 
-· 
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